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1.

SUMMl~RY:

Federal/Civil (habeas)

case
This/raises the question of whether !~~ian Tribal

-

-

1

Timely

Courts have jurisdiction over non-Indians charged with violating India

-----.

-

-

law \vhile on Indian Reservations.
-----------------~~
2. FACTS:
The Suquamish Indian tribe has its reservation in

1/
the state of Washington.- The tribe has enacted a tribal law and order

~-z-1-o

Approximately o~- ~f of the land within the reservation.is~
owned by non-Indians.
The non-Indians pbpulation on the reservat1on
vastly out-numbers the Indian population.

!/

k~~~

.

- 2 in
code to regulate the conduct of persons with/its territorial jurisdiction.
The code defines as offenses activities which would ordinarily be deemed
\ petty offenses or misdemeanors.

In accordance with the "Indian Bill

of Rights", penalties for such offenses are limited to a maximum of
six months imprisonment and/or a $500 fine.

25

u.s.c.

§

1302.

The

tribe has also established a tribal court (with Indian judges and juries)
to try alleged violations of the code.
(a) Oliphant:

u.s.c.

§§

1301, 1311.

Petr Oliphant is a non-Indian residing on the

Suquamish reservation.
celebration,

See 25

During the tribe's 1973 Chief Seattle Days

Oliphant became involved in an altercation on the tribal

encampment grounds, which are held in trust by the U.S. for the benefit
of the tribe.

When a tribal police officer attempted to halt the

disturbance, petr assaulted him and was arrested for assaulting a police
officer and resisting arrest, both violations of the tribal law and
order code.

Thereafter, he was arraigned on these charges in the trib a l

court, and bail was set in the amount of $100 for each charge.

Since

petr could not post bail, he was incarcerated for a period of five days.
He was then released on his own recognizance.
Following his release) petr sought habeas relief in the W.D.
Wash. on the ground that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over non Indians.

The dist ct disagreed and denied his petn for habeas.

There-

after, he appealed to CA 9.
(b) Belgrade:

Petr Belgrade, also a non-Indian resident of the

reservation, was arrested by tribal police on a state highway located
within the reservation (unlike

Oliph~t,

the offense and arrest did not

~-

take place on In ian trust property) for reckless driving and destruction
of tribal property in violation of the tribal law and order code.

Shortly

-

3 -

thereafter, he was arraigned on these charges in the tribal court.

After

posting bond, he was released.
Petr then also sought habeas relief in the W.D. Wash claiming that
the tribe had no jurisdiction over him.

That court saw no difference

for jurisdictional purposes between the Indian trust property on which
Oliphant's offense had occurredand the state highway running through
the reservation.

Hence, it denied relief on the basis of its earlier

decision in Oliphant.

Petr has filed a petn for cert directly from that

ruling.
3.

HOLDING BELOW:

In CA 9, Oliphant maintained that the Suquamish

had no jurisdiction over non-Indians because Congress had never conferred
such jurisdiction on them • . CA 9 rejected this contention.

In its view,

the proper inquiry was not whether Congress had conferred such jur isdic-

"

tion on the tribe, but rather, since the tribes were once sovereign states,
and as such, possessed the inherent power to preserve order by punishing

-

those who violated their laws, whether Congress had limited that/ power.
After reviewing the treaties Congress had made with the Suquamish and
the statutes which affected the tribe, CA 9 concluded that Congress had
not withdrawn that authority from it.

In this regard, it noted:

(a)

that neither the Treaty of Point Elliot, (establishing the reservation)
12 Stat. 927, nor the Treaty of 1905,

(sale of certain tribal lands)

33 Stat. 1078, mentioned the tribes power to try non-Indian criminals
while treaties with other tribes had expressly granted or withdrawn that
power;
18

(b) that § 4 of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, as amended,

u.s.c.

§

1152, while extending federal law to Indian Country, does

not purport to either extinguish tribal jurisdiction or declare federal

2/
jurisdiction exclusive; (c) that the congressional history of

§

1152

2/It distinguished Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353, relied on by
petrs-and the dissent, on-the ground that the offense there involved was
committed by a non-Indian while off Indian land.
Hence, the tribe could no t
have jurisdiction over him.
See Elk v. \'vilkins, 112 U.S. 94

- 4 supported the tribe's retention of jurisdiction over non-Indian;

(d)

that the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 u.s.c. § 1302, really had no bearin g
3/
on the question;- and (e) that Public Law 280, as modified, 25 u.s.c.
§

1321, was equally irrelevant to the inquiry since Washington had cede d

whatever jurisdiction it possessed over the tribe back to the U.S. in
4/
1971.- In addition, it found that the sections of the tribal code here
involved did not conflict with any federal law and that practical considerations supported the existence of jurisdiction since without it,
many petty violations by non-Indians would go unpunished.

Hence, CA 9

affirmed the dist ct's decision upholding the tribal court's jurisdiction
over non-Indians for violatiornof Indian law committed on trust property.

--------

Judge Kennedy dissented.

He could not agree with the majority's

basic premise -- that, in the absence of congressional action to the
contrary, the tribe possessed the authority asserted here as an incident
of its sovereignity.

In this regard, he pointed out that a tribal court's

criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian was a rather novel proposition;
,____..

-

the last federal court to pass on the question had done so in 1878 and
had indicated, in dicta, that the tribal court had no such jurisdiction,
Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cas. 353 (W.D. Ark. 1878).

Moreover, he noted

that while many decisions of this Court spoke of tribal sovereignity, e.g.
Worcester v. Ga., 31 U.S. 515, 560-61 (1832), they had done so in the
context of determining a state's jurisdiction over Indian lands where
the federal gov't had decreed a measure of autonomy for the tribe (a
preemption question), and not in the context of a tribe's attempt to

~/The court rep jected pet:J claim that he could not receive a fair
trial because only Indians would be on the jury as premature.
4/In 1957, Wash. had assumed criminal jurisdiction over the tribe
pursuant to § 7 of P.L. 280.

-

5 -

exercise jurisdiction over an individual.

In his view, principles

developed in the preemption context in order to protect the tribe from
state encroachment had little application to the situation pres e nted here
because a tribe's power to prosecute non-members was not essential to its
identity or its self-governing status.

Hence, that the case turned on

whether Congress intended tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-members.

)/J ~~.1 ~ "-,_J;;:~ /
Turning to this inquiry, he concluded that Congress, while never

explicitly saying so, did not intend the tribe to have such jurisdiction.
His examination of early Indian statutes and treaties led him to believe
that Congress had never recognized the Indians' inherent authority to
punish non-Indians.

Indeed, he pointed out that during treaty negotiations

a number of tribes attempted to secure this power from Congress without
success.

In light of this background, he argued that the absence of any

mention of this particular issue in the statutes and treaties relied on
by the majority was not surprising.

In addition, he points out numerous

references in the legislative history of a number of Indian statutes (as
late as 1970) which suggest that the tribes possess no jurisdiction
over non-members.

Finally, he notes that Congress has consistently

evidenced an intent to treat offenses by Indians against each other diff e rently from those involving non-Indians and that this distinction is refleeted in/current federal scheme for dealing with offenses on Indian land
which exempts purely "Indian" offenses from the operation of federal law
unless they fall with the "Major Crimes Act".
§

u.s.c.

§

1152 and

1153.
4.

~.

See 18

CONTENTIONS:

Petrs reiterate their claim that the tribal

court lacks jurisdiction over them.

Unfortunately, their attorney has

- 6 not done a very good job of presenting their case.

At the outset, he

maintains that the conc e pt of tribal sovereignity relied on by the
majority is somehow unconstitutional.

For the most part, howe ver, he

argues that whatever sovereignity the tribe originally possessed in this
regard has been extinguished over time by ·the numerous congressional en actments which have extended both state and federal criminal jurisdiction
over tribal lands.

This claim was rejected by CA 9 which noted that the

statutes relied on did not speak to the precise question presented here
and thus did not extinguish the tribe's concurrent jurisdiction over
offenses.

In addition, he claims that Washington's retrocession of

jurisdiction back to the U.S. was ineffective as a matter of state law.
Throughbub~ :

he emphasizes the novelity of the question.

The tribe has filed a response.

As might be expected, it argues

}that the major premise of the CA 9 majority is correct; that this Court
l has always recognized a tribe's sovereignity in the absence of contrary
congressional action, e.g., Williams v. Lee, 358

u.s.

217; U.S. v. Mazurie,

419 U.S. 544; that Congress has never expressly withdrawn the tribe's
jurisdiction over petr's offenses; and that the exercise of jurisdiction
by the tribe is consistent with Congress• policy of tribal self-government.

In addition, it argues that there is no reason for the Court to

review the Belgrade case before the 9th Circuit has had an opportunity
to do so since the case is distinguishable from Oliphant's and it is
not certain that CA 9 will find that decision controlling.
Amicus briefs have been filed by Kitsap County, Wash.

(the

county in which the reservation is located) and the Wash. AG.

The former

supports the petn for cert; it points out that the vast majority of the
reservation's population are non-Indians (150 Indians; approximately 3000

- 7 non-Indians) and merely objects to the Indians attempt to exercise
jurisdiction over the majority.

The latter supports the tribe; the

only interesting point it raises is a suggestion that a tribal court's
exercise of jurisdiction over a non-Indian is not as novel as the dissent
suggests.
5.

However, it offers no figures to support this assertion.
DISCUSSION:

.The issue presented by this case is one of first

impression in this Court.

Moreover, it would seem to be one of increasing

importance as tribal gov't's become more and more active.
On the merits, depending on one's initial premise, both the CA 9
\/\~majority

-J

and dissent offer rather persuasive arguments in support of

their position.

On the question of tribal sovereignity, the majority is

correct in pointing out that this Court has often spoken of the Indian
tribes as soverign nations, who though conquered and dependent, retain
those powers of autonomous states that are neither inconsistent with
their status nor expressly terminated by Congress.

Worcester, supra.

On the other hand, the dissent is correct in noting that those decisions
arose in a distinguishable context and that history would seem to suggest
that the tribes possessed no jurisdiction over non-Indians.

Any analysis

of the question is further complicated by the fact that congressional
policy toward the Indians has not remained consistent throughout history.
c :mtral
Since congressional intent
and federal Indian policy are/to the theories
of both the majority and dissent, the SG would seem to be an appropriate
party to call upon.
Finally, with respect to Belgrade, there would appear to be no
reason to deviate from the normal appellate process as the resp tribe
suggests.
There is a response.

2/10/77
BE

Ondrasik

CA 9 Oilphant opin
W.D. Wash. Belgrade
memo in petn.
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To:

Nancy

From:

L.F.P., Jr.

Date:

January 3, J978

Since we talked about the above case, I have spent about
three hours on the rather elaborate briefs.

This is not enough

study to justify even a tentative conclusion as to whether the
question of jurisdiction is settled under the relevant treaties,
statutes, and court decisions, but I now do have some "feel" for
the case.

The purpose of this brief note to you is to make

several general observations.
The case is one of considerable i.mportance, perhaps more
to the states in which Indian reservations continue to exist than
to Indian tribes such as the Suquamish Tribe.

It is surprising

that the question, as noted in the SG's brief, is one of first
impression - addressed in the past only by a dictum in one early
federal case.

SG's brief p. 8.

The SG's brief also conveys the impression that the
quest1on of tribal court jurisdiction is not clearly resolved by

..

'I

2.

the arguably relevant federal treaties and statutes.

The SG

supports its argument in favor of jurisdiction by the "main
thrust of federal policy" in recent years.
specific submissions:

The SG makes two

(i) that the Treaty of Point Elliott

should be read as reserving exclusive criminal jurisdiction to
the tribe for offenses not covered by the Major Crimes Act or the
Indian Civil Rights Act, and (ii) that the most relevant federal
statute - 18

u.s.c.

1152 (the 1854 statute extending federal

criminal laws to "Indian Country") may be construed as imposing a
_9QnC~f!~nt

federal jurisdiction in cases like these.

Thus, I

read the SG's brief as relying in major part on a perception of
recent federal policy to accord increased recognition to tribal
authority.
If this case is to turn on policy considerations, rather
than some firm conclusion drawn from reJ.evant federal law, I
would be inclined to weigh heavily the policy arguments in favor
of the states.

Here, I commend the amicus brief filed by the

State of Washington, the state most directly affected by this
case.

Moreover, the washington State Attorney General (Slade

Gorton) has proved - in perhaps half a dozen cases - to be among
the ablest and fairest of the state attorney generals who has
argued before us.

His description of the Port Madison Indian

Reservation reminds me of the analogous condition of the Puyallup
Reservation (said to be typical of many reservations in the
West).

Here, the reservation consists of 7,275 acreas, of which

63% is privately owned fee simple (apparently by non-Indians)

1

3.
36% remains in allotment status with the patent held in trust by
the United States: and only about 1% is tribally owned.

Of a

total population of 2,928 on the reservation, not more than 150
(the briefs vary between 50 and 150) are members of the Suquamish
Tribe.

The State of washington has exercised criminal

jurisdiction over the non-Indians on this and similar
reservations, and apparently (according to respondent's brief)
the tribal courts only recently have resumed the exercise of
asserted jurisdiction.

The state exercises full jurisdiction

over tribal members for compulsory school attendance, public
welfare, mental illness, juvenile delinquency, the building,
construction and policing of streets and highways, etc.
In terms of policy considerations, it makes no sense to
allow 50 to J50 Indians to set up a "trjbal court" and assume
jurisdiction - whether concurrent or not - over more than 2,800
non-Indians who live within the technical boundary of the
reservation, and who own in fee most of the land.
I realize that Indian law is indeed "a Jaw unto itself",
and often seems incompatible with broader pubJic interests.

I am

inclined to accept a large measure of autonomy where the issue
involves the preservation of tribal history, culture and the
rights of Indians.

But this case involves the attempt by a

handful of Indians to exercise crjminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians in a manner., and for purposes, unrelated to the
preservat5on of tribal integrity.

4.

Thus, as you will see, I am inclined - on the basis of
my understanding of the case at this time - strongly to favor
reversaJ.

Yet,

I

have not attempted to thread my way through the

labyrinth of treaty, statute and case Jaw that may be reJevant.
I

hope it will not be necessary for you to write a bench memo in

proportion to the outrageously long briefs for petitioners.

My

own tentative impression is that the federal statutes fairly can
be construed to deny jurisdiction.

My guess is that, as the

Attorney General of washington argues, the fundamental error of
CA 9 was in viewing "tribal sovereignty" as a geographic concept
rather than a personal concept.
seq.

See amicus brief, pp. 6, 17 et
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 76-5729
Mark David Oliphant and Daniel B. On Writ of Certiorari to
t h e U n i ted States
Belgarde, Petitioners,
v.
Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
The Suquamish Indian Tribe et al.
[February -, 1978]
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~1-f

2---/z."'/71
til,~
~

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
Two hundred years a.go, the area bordering Puget Sound
consisted of a. large number of politically autonomous Indian ~
villages, each occupied by from a. few dozen to over a. hundred
Indians. Through a series of treaties in the mid-19th century, Gt- r ~
these loosely related villages were aggregated into a series of ~
Indian tribes, one of which, the Suquamish, has become the . _,I~ _ . .J._
focal point of this litigation. By the 1855 Treaty of Point .......,.-~ •
Elliott, 12 Stat. 927, the Suquamish Indian Tribe relinquished
all rights that they might have had in the lands of the State
of Washington and agreed to settle on a 7,276-acre reservation
near Port Madison, Wash. Located on Puget Sound across
from the city of Seattle, the Port Madison Reservation is a
checkerboard of tribal community land, allotted Indian lands,
property held in fee-simple by non-Indians, and various roads
and public highways maintained by Kitsap County. 1

u ____ . _ /

1 According to the District Court's findings of fact, the "Port Madison
Indian Reservation consists of approximately 7,276 acres of which approximately 63% thereof is owned in fee-simple absolute by non-Indians and
the remaining 37% i:s Indian owned lands subject to the trust ~tatus of the
United States, consisting mostly of unimproved acreage upon which no
persons reside. Residing on the reservation is an estimated population of
approximately 2,928 non-Indians living in 976 dwelling units. There lives
on the reservation approximately 50 members of the Suquamish Indian
Tribe. Within the re~rvtttion are numerous public highways of the State

•• •.J
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OLIPHANT v. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE

The Suquamish Indians are governed by a tribal government
which in 1973 adopted a Law and Order Code. The Code,
which covers a variety of offenses from theft to rape, purports
to extend the Tribe's criminal jurisdiction over both Indians
and non-Indians.~ Proceedings are held in the Suquamish
Indian ProvisionaJ Court. Pursuant to the lndian Civil
Rights Act of 1968. 25 U. S. C. ~ 1302. defendants are entitled
to many of the due process protections accorded to defendants
in federal or state criminal proceedings. However, the guarantees are not identical. Non-Indians. for example, are
excluded from Suquamish tribal court juries."
of Washington, public schools, public utilities and other facilities in which
neithrr the Suquamish Indian Tribe nor the United States has any ownership or inter('st."
The Suquamish Indian Tribr, unlike many other Indian tribes, did not
consent to non-Indian homrsteading of unallott.ed or "surplus" lands within
their resrrvation purmant. t9 25 U. S. C. § 348 and 43 U. S. C. §§ 11951197. Instead, the substantial non-Indian population on the Port Madison
Reservation it:~ primarily thr result. of the sale of Indian allotments to
non-Indians by the Secretary of thr Interior. Congressional legislation has
allowed such sales where the allotments were in heirship, fell to " incompetrnts," or wrre surrendered in lieu of other selections. The substantial
non-Indian::; land-holdings on the Reservation is also a result of the lifting
of various trust restrictions which has enabled individual Indians to sell
their allotments. See 25 U . S. C.§§ 349 and 392.
·z Notiers werr placrd in prominent. places at the entrances to t he Port
Mildison Reservation informing the public that ent ry onto the re::;ervation
would be d€'emed implied consent to the criminal jurisdiction of the
Suquamish tribal court.
3 ln Talttm v. Mayes , 163 U. S. 37() (1896) , this Court held that. the
Bill of Rights in the Federal Constitution does not apply to Indian tribal
governments. Through the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, Congress
extended many due process guarantees to defendants before Indian tribal
courts, but the guarantees are not identi cal tD those set out in the Federal
Constitution. Thus, the Act provides for "a trial by jury of not less than
six persons," 25 U. S. C. § 1302 (10) , but the tribal court. is not prohibited
from excluding non-Indians from the jury even where a non-Indian is being
tried. In 1976,, th() Suquamish Trioe amended its Law and Order Code to

.

\
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Both petitioners are non-Indian residents of the Port
Madison Reservation. Petitioner Mark David Oliphant was
arrested by tribal authorities during the Suquamish's annual
Chief Seattle Days celebration and charged with assaulting a
tribal officer and resisting arrest. After arraignment before
the tribal court, Oliphant was released on his own recognizance.
Petitioner Daniel B. Belgarde was arrested by tribal authorities after an alleged high-speed race along the reservation
highways that only ended when Belgarde collided with a tribal
police vehicle. Belgarde posted bail and was released. Six
days later he was arraigned and charged under the tribal code
with "recklessly endangering another person" and injuring
tribal property. Tribal court proceedings against both petitioners have been stayed pending a decision in this case.
Both petitioners applied for a writ of habeas corpus to the
United States District Court for the Western District of
Washington. Petitioners argued that the Suquamish Indian
Provisional Court does not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. In separa.te proceedings, the District Court disagreed with petitioners' argument and denied the petitions.
On August 5, 1974, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed the denial of habeas corpus in the case of petitiouer
Oliphant. 544 F. 2d 1007. Petitioner Belgarde's appeal is
still pending before the Court of Appeals. We granted certiorari, 431 U. S. 964, to decide whether Indian tribal courts
have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. We decide that
they do not.
I
Respondents do not contend that their exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians stems from affirmative congressional authorization or treaty provision.4 Instead, respondents
provide that only Suquamish Tribal members shall ·erve as juror::; in tribal
court.
~Respondents do contend that Congress has "confirmed" thr power of
Indian tribes to try and punish non-Indians through the Indian Reorgani-

76-5729-0PINION
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urge that such jurisdiction flows automatically from the
"Tribe's retained inherent powers of government over the Port
Madison Indian Reservation." Seizing on language in our
opinions describing Indian tribes as "quasi-sovereign entities,"
see, e. g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U. S. 535, 552 (1974), the
Court of Appeals agreed and held that Indian tribes, "though
conquered and dependent, retain those powers of autonomous
states that are neither inconsistent with their status nor
expressly terminated by Congress." According to the Court
of Appeals, criminal jurisdiction over anyone committing an
offense on the reservation is a "sine qua non" of such powers.
The Suquamish Indian Tribe does not stand alone today in
its assumption of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Of
the 127 reservation court systems that currently exercise
criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 33 purport to extend
zation Act of 1934, 25 U. S. C. § 476, and the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968, 25 U. S. C. § 1302. Neither Act, however, addre~ses, let alone
"confirms," tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. The Indian
Reorganization Act merely gives each Indian tribe the right "to organize
for its common welfare" and to "adopt an appropriate constitution and
bylaws." With certain specific additions not relevant here, the tribal
council is to have such power::; as are vested "by existing law." The Indian
Civil Rights Act merely extends to "any person" within the tribe's
jurisdiction certain enumerated guarantees of the Bill of Rights of the
Federal Constitution.
As respondents note, an early version of the Indian Civil Rights Act
extended its guarantees only to "American Indians," rather than to "any
person." The purpose of the later modification was to extend the Act's
guarantees to "all persons who may be subject to the jurisdiction of tribal
governments, whether Indians or non-Indians." Summary Report on the·
Constitutional Rights of American Indians, Subcomm. on Const. Rights
of the Senate Judiciary Corum., 89th Cong., 2d S!'S«., at 10 (1966). But
this change was certainly not intended to giv<' Indian tribes criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Nor can it be read to "confirm" respondents' argument that Indian tribes have inherent criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians. Instead , the modification merely demonstrates Congress'
desire to extend the Act's guarantees to non-Indian::; if and where they
come under a tribe's criminal or civil jurisdiction by either treaty provision.
qr act of Con~ress.
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that jurisdiction to non-Indians. 5 Twelve other Indian tribes
have enacted ordinances which would permit the assumption
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians. Like the Suquamish these tribes claim authority to try non-Indians not on the
basis of congressional statute or treaty provision but by reason
of their retained national sovereignty.
The effort by Indian tribal courts to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, however, is a relatively new
phenomenon. And where the effort has been made in the
past, it has been held that the jurisdiction did not exist. Until
the middle of this century, few Indian tribes maintained any
:semblance to a formal court system. Offenses by one Indian
against another were usually handled by social and religious
pressure and not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was
on restitution rather than on punishment. In 1834 the Commissioner of Indian Affairs described the then status of Indian
criminal systems: "With the exception of two or three tribes,
who have within a few years past attempted to establish some
few laws and regulations amongst themselves, the Indian
tribes are without laws, and the chiefs without much authority
to exercise any restraint." H. R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong.,
1st Sess., at 91 (1834).
It is therefore not surprising to find no specific discussion of
the problem before us in the volumes of United States Reports.
But the problem did not lie entirely dormant for two centuries.
5 Of the 127 courts currently operating on Indian reservations, 71
(including the Suquamish Indian Provisional Court) are tribal courts,
establi~hed and functioning pursuant t.o tribal legislative powers; 30 are
"CFR Courts'' operating under the Code of Federal Regulations, 25 CFR
§ 11 (1977); 16 are traditional courts of the New Mexico pueblos; and 10
a.re ron~ervation courts. The CFR Courts are the offspring to the Courts
of Indian Offenses, first provided for in the Indian Department Appropriations Aet of 1888, 25 Stat. 217, 233. See W. Hagan, Indian Police a.n d
Judgf's ( Hl66). By l'egula tions issued in 1935, the jurisdiction of CFR
Courts is restricted to offenses committed by Indians wit.hin the reservation.
25 CFR § 11 .2 (a) ( 1977). The case before us is concerned only with the:
t:rhninal jurisdiction of tribal courts.
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A few tribes during the 19th century did have formal criminal
systems. From the earliest treaties with these tribes, it was
apparently presumed that the tribes did not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians absent a congressional statute or
treaty provision to that effect. For example, the 1830 Treaty
with the Choctaw Indian Tribe, which had one of the most
sophisticated of tribal structures, guaranteed to the tribe "the
jurisdiction and government of all the persons and property
that may be within their limits." Despite the broad terms of
this governmental guarantee, however, the Choctaws at the
conclusion of this treaty provision "express a wish that Congress may grant to the Choctaws the right of punishing by
their own laws any white man who shall come into their nation,
and infringe any of their national regulations." 6 Such a
6 The history of Indian treaties in the United States is consistent with
the principle that Indian tribes may not assume criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians without the permission of Congrf'ss. The earliest treaties
typically expressly provided that "any citizen of the United States, who
shaiJ do an injury to any Indian of the [tribal] nation, or to any other
Indian or Indians residing in their towns, and under their protection, shall
be punished according to the laws of the United States." Sec, e. g .. Treaty
with the Shawnee, Art. III, 7 Stat. 26 (1786). While, as elaborated
further below, these provi~ions were not necessary to rf'move criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians from thE' Indian tribes, they would naturally
have served an important function in the developing stage of United
States-Indian relations by clarifying jurisdictional limits to the Indian
tribes. The same treaties generalJy provided that "[i]f any citizen of the
United States .. . shall settle on any of the lands hereby allotted to the
Indians to live and hunt on, such person shall forfeit the protection of the
United States of America, and the Indians may punish him or not as they
please." See, e. g., Treaty with the Choctaw, Art. IV, 7 Stat . 21 (1786).
Far from representing a recognition of any inherent Indian criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians settling on tribal lands, these provisions were
instead intended as a means of discouraging non-Indian settlements on
Indian territory, in cont.ravention of treaty provisions to the contrary.
See 5 Annals of Congress 903-904 (April 9, 1796). Later trf'aties dropped
this provision and provided instead that non-Indian settlers would be
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request for affirmative congressional authority is inconsistent
with respondents' belief that criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians is inherent in tribal sovereignty. Faced by attempts
removed by the United States upon complaint being lodged by the tribe.
See, e. g., Treaty with the Sauk and Foxes, 7 Stat. 84 ( 1804).
.
As the relationship between Indian tribes and the United States
developed through the passage of time, specific provisions for the punishment of non-Indians by the United States, rather than by the tribes, :;]owly
disappeared from the tveaties. Thus, for example, none of the treaties
signed by Washington Indians in the 1850's explicitly proscribed criminal
prosecution and punishment of non-Indians by the Indian tribes. As
discussed below, however, several of the t.r~>aty provisions can be read as
recognizing that criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians would be in the
United States rather than in the tribes. The disappearance of provisions
explicitly providing for the punishment of non-Indians by the United
States, rather than by the Indian tribes, coincides with and is at least
partly explained by the extension of federal enclave la.w over non-Indians
in the Trade and Intercourse Acts and the general recognition by Attorneys
General and lower federal courts tha.t Indians did not have jurisdiction
to try non-Indians. See infra, at. S-,.10. When it was felt. neoessary to
expressly spell out respective jurisdictions, later treaties still provided that
criminal jurisdiction oyer non-Indians would be in the United States. See,
e. g., Treaty with the Utah-Tabequache Band, Art. 6, 13 Stat. 673 (1863).
Only one treaty signed by the United States has ever provided for any
form of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians (other than in the
illegal settler context noted above). The first treaty signed by the United
Sta.tes with an Indian tribe, the 1778 Treaty with the Delawares, provided
that neither party to the treaty could "proceed to the infliction of punishments on the citizens of the other, otherwise than by securing the o.ffender
or offenders by imprisonment, or any other competent means, till a fair
and impartial trial can be had by judges or juries of both parties, as near
as can be to the laws, customs and usages of the contracting parties and
natural justice: The mode of such tria'ls to be hereafter fixed by the wise
rnen of the United States in Congress assembled, with the assistance
of ... deputies of the Delaware nation . . . . " Treaty with the Delawn,res, Art. IV, 7 Stat. 13 (1778) (emphasis added). While providing for
Delaware participation in the trial of non-Indians, this treat.y iiectim~
established that non-Indians could only be tried under thP auspices of the
U~1itea States and in a manner fixed by the Continental Congres~.
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of the Choctaw Tribe to try non-Indian offenders in the early~
1800's the Un.ited States Attorneys General also concluded
that the Choctaws did not have criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians absent congressional authority. See 2 Opinions of
the Attorney General 693 ( 1834) ; 7 Opinions of the Attorney
General 174 ( 1855). According to the Attorney General in
1834, tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is inter alia
inconsistent with treaty provisions recognizing the sovereignty
of the United States over the territory assigned to the Indian
nation and the dependence of the Indians on the United States.
At least one court has previously considered the power of
Indian courts to try non-Indians and it also held against
jurisdiction. 7 In Ex parte Kenyon, 14 Fed. Cases 353 (WD
Ark. 1878), Judge Isaac C. Parker, who as District Court Judge
for the Western District of Arkansas was constantly exposed
to the legal relationships between Indians and non-Indians, 8
7 According to Felix Cohen's Handbook of Ji'ederallndian Law, "attempts
of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians ... have been generally
condemned by the £ederal courts since the end of the treaty-making period,
and the writ of habeas corpus has been used to discharge white defendants
from tribal custody." F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 148
(United States Dept. of the Interior 1942).
8 Judge Parker sat as the judgr of t.he United States District Court. for
the Western District of Arkansas from 1875 until 1896. By rea:;on of the
laws of Congress in effect at the time, that particular court handled not
only the normal docket of ~ederal casrs arising in the We:;tern District of
Arkansas, but also had criminal jurisdiction over what wa:; then called the
"Indian Territory." This area varird in sizE' during Parker's tenure; at
one time it extended as far wes1 as thr •ea;;tern border of Colorado, and
always included substantial part:,; of what. would later become the State·
of Oklahoma. In the exercise of this juri:;dict.ion over the Indian Territory,
the Court in which he sat was nece:;sarily in constant contact with
individual Indians, the tribes of which they were members, and the white·
men who dealt with them and often preyed upon them .
.Judge Parker's views of the law were not always upheld by this Court...
See II Wigmore on Evidence § 276, at 115--116, n. 3 (3d ed. 1940). A
1:eacj.in~ of Wigmore, however, indicates that he was as critical of the·
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held that to give an Indian tribal "court jurisdiction of the
person of an offender, such offender must be an Indian." !d.,
at 355. The conclusion of Judge Parker was reaffirmed only
recently in a 1970 Opinion of the Solicitor of the Department
of the Interior. See 77 I. D. 113 (1970).9
While Congress was concerned almost from its beginning
with the special problems of law enforcement on the Indian
reservations, it did not initially address itself tp the problem
of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians. For the reasons previously stated, there was little reason to be concerned with
assertions of tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians because
of the absence of formal tribal judicia] systems. Instead,
Congress' concern was with providing effective protection for
the Indians "from the violence of the lawless part of our
frontier inhabitants." Seventh Aqrrual Address of President
George Washington, I Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1789-1797, at 181, 185 (1897, J. Richardson, ed.). Without
deci~ions of this Court there mentioned as this Court was of the evidentiary
rulings of Judge Parker. Nothing in these long forgotten disputes detracts
from the universal esteem in which the Indian tribes which were subject to
the jurisdiction of his court held .Judge Parker. One of his biographers,
describing the judge's funeral, states that after the grave was filled "[t]he
principal chief of the Choctaws, Plea:sant Porter, came forward and placed
a wreath of wild flowers on the grave." H. Croy, He Hanged Them
High (1952).
It may be that .Judge Parker's views as to the ultimate destiny of the
Indian people are not in accord with current thinking on the subject, but
we have observed in mol'e than one of our cases that the views of the
people on this issue as reflected in the judgments of Congress itself have
changed from one era to the next. See Kake Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60,
71-74 (1962). There cannot be the :slightest doubt that .Judge Parker
was, by his own lights and by the lights of the time in which he lived, a
judge who was thoroughly acquainted with and sympathetic to the
Indians a.nd Indian tribes which were subject to the jurisdiction of his
court, as well as familinr with the law which governed them. See
generally Hell on the Border (1971, .J. G11egory & R. Strickland, eds.)
9 The 1970 Opinion of the Solicitor was withdrawn in 1974 but has not
been repla.ced. No reason was given for the withdrawal.

''·
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such protection, it was felt that "all the exertions of the
Government to prevent destructive retaliations by the Indians
will prove fruitless and all our present agreeable prospects
illusory." !Oid. Beginning with the Trade and Intercourse
Act of 1790. 1 Stat. 137, therefore, Congress assumed federal
jurisdiction over offenses by non-Indians against Indians
"which would be punishable in the state or district if committed against a White. " In 1817, Congress went one step
further and extended federal enclave law to the Indian
Country; the only exception was for "any offense committed
by one Indian against another." 3 Stat. 383, as amended, 18
U. S. C. § 1152.
It was in the same year that Congress was first directly
faced with the prospect of Indians trying non-Indians. In the
Western Territory Bill/° Congress proposed to create an
Indian territory beyond the western-directed destination of
the settlers; the territory was to be governed by a confederation of Indian tribes and was expected ultimately to become
a State of the Union. In creating by legislation a political
territory with broad governing powers, Congress was careful
not to give the tribes of the territory criminal jurisdiction over
United States officials and citizens traveling through the
area.11 The reasons were quite practical:
"Officers, and persons in the service of th e United
States, and persons required to reside in the Indian counSee H . R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., l f't Se:;s., at 36 (1834) .
The We,;t.ern Territory Bill, like the early Indian treati r~. ;.;re n . 6,
sur>ra. did not extend the prot ection of 1he United State,; to non-Indians
who Sl'ttll'd without Government bu :; ine~s in Indian territory . Sr r Western
Territory Bill, § 6, in H . R . Rep . No . 474, 2:~d Cong., 1st Se:><>., at 35 ;
id., at 18. This exception, like that in the early trea ties, wm; pre::;umably
meant to discourage settlement on land that was reserved exclusively for
the UAe of the variom; Indian tribes. Today, m a n~· reserva tions, includingthe Port Madison Reservation, have extensive non-Indian populations.
The pl.'rcentage of non-Indian ref'ident ~ grew as a direct and intended
:cesult Qf congressional l)olicics i1,1 the late 19th and ea rly 20th centuries
10
11
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try by treaty stipulation, must necessarily be placed under
the protection, and subject to the laws of the United
Sta.tes. To persons merely travelling in the Indi!ln country the same protection is extended. The want of fixed
laws, of competent tribunals of justice, which must for
some time continue in the Indian country, absolutely
requires for the peace of both sides that this protection be
extended." H. R. Rep. No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., at
18 (1834).
Congress' concern over criminal jurisdiction in this proposed
Indian Territory contrasts markedly with its tota.l failure to
address criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on other reservations, which frequently bordered non-India.n settlements.
The contrast suggests that Congress shared the view of the
Executive Branch and lower federal courts that Indian tribal
courts were without jurisdiction to try non-Indians.
This unspoken assumption was also evident in other congressional actions during the 19th century. In 1854, for
ex~tmple, Congress amended the Trade and Intercourse Act to
proscribe the prosecution in federal court of an Indian who has
already been tried in tribal court. 10 Stat. 270, as amended,
18 U. S. C. § 1152. No s1mila.r provision, such as would have
been required by parallel logic if tribal courts had jurisdiction
over non-Indians, was enacted barring retrial of non-Indians.
Similarly, in the Major Crimes Act of 1885, Congress placed
under the jurisdiction of federal courts India.n offenders who
promoting the assimilation of the Indians into the non-Indian culture.
Respondents point to no statute, in comparison to the Western Territory
Bill, where Congress has intended to give Indian tribes jurisdiction today
over nOli-Indians residing within reservations.
Even as drafted, many Congressmen felt that the Bill was too radical
a. shift in United States-Indian relations :mel the Bill was tabled. See 10
Register of Cong. Debates 4779 (June 25, 1834) . While the Western
Territory Bill was resubmitted ~everal times in revised form, it was never
passed. See generally R. Gittinger, The Formation of the State ef
Oklahoma (1930).
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commit certain specified major offenses. 25 Sta.t. 385, as
amended. 18 U. S. C. § 1153. If tribal courts may try nonIndians, however, as respondents contend, those tribal courts
are free to try non-Indians even for such major offenses as
Congress may well have given the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction to try members of their own tribe committing the
exact same offenses. 12
In 1891, this Court recognized that Congress' various actions
and inactions in regulating criminal jurisdiction on Indian
reservations demonstrated an intent to reserve jurisdiction
over non-Indians for the federal courts. Iu In re Mayfield,
141 U.S. 107, 115-116 (1891), the Court noted that the policy
of Congress had been to allow the inhabita.n ts of the Indian
country "such power of self-government as was thought to be
12 The Major Crimes Act provides that Indians committing any of the
enumerated offenses "shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all
other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States." While the question has never been
directly addressed by this Court, courts of appeals have read this language·
to 'exclude tribal jurisdiction over the Indian offender. Sec, e. g., Sam v.
United States, 385 F. 2d 213, 214 (CAlO 1967); Felicia v. United States,
495 F. 2d 353, 354 (CA8 1974).
The legislative history of the original version of the Major Crimes Act,
which was introduced as a House amendment to the Indian Appropriation
Bill of 1854, creates some confusion on the question of exclusive jurisdiction. As originally worded, the amendment would have provided for trial
in the United States courts "and not otherwise." Apparently at the
suggestion of Congressman Budd, who believed that concurrent juri;:;diction
in the courts of the United Stateo was sufficient, the words "and not
otherwise" were deleted when the amendment was later reintroduced. See
16 Cong. Rec. 934-935 (Jan. 22, 1885). However, as finally accepted by
the Senate and passed by both Houses, the amendment did provide that the
Indian offender would be punished as any other offender, "within the ·
exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." The issue of exclusive jurisdiction over major crimes was mooted for all practical purposes by the
passage of the Indian Civil Right::; Act of 1968 which limits the punishment
that can be impo~:>cd by Indian tribal courts to a term of 6 months or a
fi.pe of $500.

'
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-consistent with the safety of the White population with which
they may have come in contact, and to encourage them as far
.-as possible in raising themselves to our standard of civilization." The "general object" of the congressional statutes was
to allow Indian nations criminal "jurisdiction of all controversies between India.ns, or where a member of the nation is
the only party to the proceeding, and to reserve to the courts
of the United States jurisdiction of all actions to which its own
citizens are parties on either side." Ibid. While Congress
never expressly forbade Indian tribes to impose criminal penalties on non-Indians, we now make express our implicit
conclusion of nearly a century ago that Congress consistently
believed this to be the necessa.ry result of its repeated legislative actions.
In a 1960 Senate Report, tha.t body expressly confirmed its
assumption that Indian tribal courts are without inherent
jurisdiction to try non-lndia.ns, and must depend on the
Federal Government for protection from intruders. 1 " In considering a statute that would prohibit unauthorized entry
upon Indian land for the purpose of hunting or fishing, the
Senate Report noted that
"The problem confronting Indian tribes with sizable
reservations is that the United States provides no protecIn 1977, a Congressional Policy Review Commission, citing the lower
court decisions in Oliphant and Belgarde, concluded that. "[t.]here is an
established legal basis for tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians."
1 Final Report of tile American Indian Policy Review Commission 114,
117, and 152-154 (1977). However, the Commission's Report does not
deny that for almost two hundred years before the lower courts decided
Oliphant and Belgarde, the three branch of the Federal Government were
in apparent agreement that Indian tribes do not have jurisdiction over
non-Indians. As the Vice-Chainnan of the Commission noted in dissent,
"such general jurisdiction has generally not been asserted and ... the
lack of legislation on this point reflects a congressional assumption that
there was no such tribal jurisdiction." Id., at 587 (di~senting views of
Cong. Lloyd Meeds).
13

'76-572~0PINION

· 14

OLIPHANT v. SUQUAMISH INDIAN TRIBE

tion against trespassers comparable to the protection it
gives to Federal property as exemplified by title 18, United
States Code, section 1863 [trespass on national forest
lands]. Indian property owners should have the same
protection as other property owners. For example, a
private hunting club may keep nonmembers off its game
lands or it may issue a permit for a fee. One who comes
on such lands without permission may be prosecuted
under State law but a non-Indian trespasser on an
Indian reservation enjoys immunity. This is by reason
of the fact that Indian tribal law is enforcible aga.i nst
Indians only; not against non-Indians.
"Non-Indians are not subject to the jurisdiction of Indian
courts and cannot be tried in Indian courts on trespass
charges. Further, there are no Federal laws which can be
invoked against trespassers.

"The committee has considered this bill and believes
that the legislation is meritorious. The legislation will
give to the Indian tribes and to individual Indian owners
certain rights that now exist as to others, and fills a gap
in the present law for the protection of their property."'
S. Rep. No. 1686, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 2- 3 (1960}
(emphasis added).
II
While not conclusive on the issue before us, the commonly
shared presumption of Congress, the Executive Branch, and
lower federal courts that tribal courts do not have the power
to try non-Indians carries considerable weight. Cf. Draper v.
United States, 164 U. S. 240, 245-247 (1896); Morris v.
Hitchcock , 194 U. S. 384, 391- 393 (1904); Warren Trading
Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U. S. 685, 690 (1965);
DeCoteau v. District Cty Ct., 420 U.S. 425, 444- 445 (1965).
('Indian law" draws principally upon the treaties drawn and

\.
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·executed by the Executive Branch and legislation passed by
Congress. These instruments, which beyond their actual text
form the backdrop for the intricate web of judicially made
Indian law, ca.nnot be interpreted in isolation but must be read
in light of the common notions of the day and the assumptions
of those who drafted them. Ibid.
While in isolation the Treaty of Point Elliott, 12 Stat. 927
( 1855), would appear to be silent as to tribal criminal j urisdiction over non-Indians, the addition of historical perspective
casts substantial doubt upou the existence of such jurisdic.:.
tion. 14 In the Ninth Article, for example, the Suquamish
When treaties with the Washington Tribes were first contemplated, the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs sent instructions to the Commission to
Hold Treaties with the Indian Tribes in Washington Territory and in the
Blackfoot Country. Included with the instructions were copies of treaties
previously negotiated with the Omaha Indians, 10 Stat. 1043, and with the
Oto and Misr,;ouri Indians, 10 Stat. 1038, which the Commissioner "regarded
as exhibiting provisions proper on the part of the Government and
advantages to the Indian::;" and which he felt would "afford valuable
suggestions." The criminal provisions of the Treaty of Point Elliott are
clearly patterned after the criminal provisions in these "exemplary"
treaties, in most respects copying the provisions Vterbatim. Like the
Treaty of Point Elliott, the treaties with the Omaha and with the Oto and
Missouri did not specificai!y address the issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.
Sometime after the receipt of these instructions, the Washington treaty
Commission itself prepared and discussed a draft treaty which specifically
provided that "[i]njuries committed by whites towards them [are] not to
be revenged, but on complaint being made they shall be tried by the Laws
of the United States and if convicted the offenders punished." For some
unexplained reason, however, in negotiating a treaty with the Indians, the
Commission went back to the langu&ge used in the two "exemplary"
treaties sent. by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Although respondents
contend that the Commission returned to the original language because of
tribal opposition to relinquishment of criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians, there is no evidence to support this view of the matter. Instead,
it seems probable that the Commission preferred to use the language tha.t
had been recommended by the Office of Indian Affairs. As discussed
below, the language ultimately used, wherein the Tribe acknowledged their
dependence on the United States and promised to be "friendly with aU
14
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"acknowledge their dependence on the Government of the
United States." As Chief Justice Marshall explained in
Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515,551-552,554 (1832), such an
acknowledgement is not a mere abstract recognition of the
United States' sovereignty. "The Indian nations were, from
their situation, necessarily dependent on [the United States]
for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into
their country." !d., at 554. By acknowledging their dependence on the United States, in the Treaty of Point Elliott, the
Suquamish were in all probability recognizing that the United
States would arrest and try non-Indian intruders who came
within their reservation. Other provisions of the Treaty also
point to the absence of tribal jurisdiction. Thus the tribe
"agree [s] not to shelter or conceal offenders against the laws
of the United States, but to deliver them up to the authorities
for trial." Read in conjunction with 18 U. S. C. § 1152, which
extends federal enclave 1aw to non-Indian offenses on Indian
reservations. this provision implies that the Suquamish are to
promptly deliver up any non-Indian offender, rather than try
and punish him themselves.H
By themselves, these treaty provisions would probably not
be sufficient to remove criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians
if the Tribe otherwise retained such jurisdiction. But an
examination of our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even
ignoring treaty provisions and congressional policy, Indians da
citizens thereof," could well have been understood as acknowledging
exclusive federal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
1 5 In intrrpreting Indian treatie,; and statutes, '· d]oubtful expressions
are to br resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are the
wards of tht> nation, dependent upon its protection and good faith.".
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U. S. 164, 174 (1973), see
The Kansas Indians. 5 Wall. 737, 760 (1866) ; United States v. N ice, 241
U . S. 591, 599 (1916) . But treaty and statutory provisions which are not
clear on their face may " be clear from the surrounding circumstances and
legislative history." Cf. D eCoteau v . District Cty Ct., 420 U. S. 425 , 444.
(1975),

r
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not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress. Indian tribes do
retain elements of "quasi-sovereign" authority after ceding
their lands to the United States and announcing their dependence on the Federal Government. See The Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 5 Peters 1, 15 (1831). As we decide today in United
States v. Wheeler, post, at - , the power of Indian tribes to
govern the lives of their members, including the power to
punish members who transgress a.g ainst their laws, flows from
this retained quantum of governing authority and does not
rely on affirmative congressional authorization. But the
tribes' retained powers are not such that they are limited only
by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments.
As the Court of Appeals recognized, Indian tribes are proscribed from exercising both those powers of autonomous
. states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those
powers "inconsistent with t'heir status." 544 F. 2d . at 1009.
Indian reservations are "a part of the territory of the United
States." United States v. ·Rogers, 4 How. 567, 571 (1846).
Indian tribes "hold and occupy [the reservations] with the
assent of the United States, and under their authority." Id.,
at 572. Upon incorporation into the territory of the United
States, the Indian tribes thereby come under the territorial
sovereignty of the United States and their exercise of separate
power is constrained so as not to conflict with the interests of
this overriding sovereignty. "[T]heir rights of complete
sovereignty, as independent na.tions, ·[are] necessarily diminished." Johnson v. M'Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574 (1823).
We have already described some of the inherent limitations
on tribal powers th11t stem from their incorporation into the
United States. In Johnson v. M'lntosh , supra, we noted that
the Indian tribes' "power to dispose of the soil at their own
will, to whomever they pleased," was inherently lost to the
overriding sovereignty of the United States. And in The
'(Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, supra, the Chief Justice observed
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that since Indian tribes are "completely under the sovereignty
and dominion of the United States . . . . any attempt [by
foreign nations] to acquire their lands, or to form a political
C0111lex10n with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of our territory. and an act of hostility." 5 Pet., at 16.
Nor are the intrinsi'c limitations on Indian tribal authority
restricted to limitations on the tribes' power to transfer lands
or exercise external political sovereignty. In the first case to
reach this Court dealing with the fltatus of Indian tribes, Mr.
Justice Johnson in a sepa.rate concurrence summarized the
nature of the limitations inherently flowing from the overriding sovereignty of the United States as follows: "[T]he
restrictions upon the right of soil in the Indians, amounts ...
to an exclusion of all competitors [to the United States] from
their markets; a.nd the limitation upon their sovereignty
amounts to the right of governing every person within their
limits except themselves." Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87, 147
(1810) (separa.te opinion of Johnson, J.). Protection of territory within its external political boundaries is, of course.
central to the sovereign interests of the United States as it is
to any other sovereign nation. But from the formation of the
Union and the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the United
States has manifested an equally great solicitude that its
citizens be protected by the United States from unwarranted
intrusions on their personal liberty. The power of the United
States to try and criminally punish is an important manifestation of the power to restrict personal liberty. By submitting
to the overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian
tribes therefore necessarily give up their power to try citizens
of the United States except in a manner acceptable to Congress. This principle would have been obvious 11: century ago
when most Indian tribes were characterized by a "want of fixed
laws [and] of competent tribunals of justice." H. R. Rep.
No. 474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1834) . It should be no
less obyio.us tQday, evet1 though present day Indian . triba[

'·.
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courts embody dramatic advances over their historical
antecedents.
In Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883) , the Court was
faced with almost the inverse of the issue before us herewhether. prior to the passage of the Major Crimes Act. federal
courts had jurisdiction to try Indians who had offended
against fellow Indians on reservation land. In concluding that
criminal jurisdiction was exclusively in the tribe, it found
particular guidance in the "nature and circumstances of the
case." The United States was seeking to extend United
States
"law. by argument and inference only, . . . over aliens
and strangers; over the members of a community separated by race [and] tradition, ... from the authority
and power which seeks to impose upon them the restraints
of an external and unknown code ... ; which judges
them by a standard made by others and not for them ....
It tries them , not by their peers, nor by the customs of
their people, nor the law of their land , but by ... a
different race, according to the law of a social state of
which they have an imperfect conception. . .. " I d.,
at 571.
These considerations, applied here to the non-Indian rather
than Indian offender, speak equally strongly against the
validity of respondents' contention that Indian tribes, although
fully subordinated to the sovereignty of the United States,
retain the power to try non-Indians according to their own
customs and procedure.
As previously noted, Congress extended the jurisdiction of
federal courts. in the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790, to
offenses committed by non-Indians against Indians within
Indian Country. In doing so, Congress was careful to extend
to the non-Indian offender the basic criminal rights that would
attach in non-Indian related cases. Under respondents'
theory, however, Indian tribes would have been free to try the

76-5729-0PINION
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same non-Indians without these careful proceedings unless
Congress affirmatively legislated to the contrary. Such an
exercise of .i urisdiction over non-Indian citizens of the United
States would belie the tribes' forfeiture of full sovereignty in
return for the protection of the United States.
In summary, respondents' position ignores that
"Indians are within the geographical limits of the United
States. The soil and people within these limits are under
the political control of the Government of the United
States. or of the States of the Union. There exists in the
broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may
be cities. counties, and other organized bodies with limited
legislative functions, but they . . . exist in subordination
to one or the other of these two." United States v.
Kagarna, 118 U.S. 375,379 (1886).
We recognize that some Indian tribal court systems have
become increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many
respects their state counterpa.rts. We also acknowledge that
with the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which
extends certain basic procedural rights to anyone tried in
Indian tribal court, many of the dangers that might have
accompanied the exercise by tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few decades ago have disappeared.
Finally. we are not unaware of the prevalence of non-Indian
crime on today's reservations which the tribes forcefully argue
requires the ability to try non-Indians. 1 n But these are considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian
tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians. They
have little relevance to the principles which lead us to conclude
·1.6 See 4 National American Indi1111 Conrt .Judges Association , .Justice and
the American Indian 51-52 (Hl74) ; HParings on S. 1 and S. 1400 (Reform
of the Federal Criminal Law~) bE-fore 1br Subcommittee on Criminal Laws
and Proeodures of th~> Senatl' Committee on the .Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., Part VIII, p . 6469 et seq . (1973).
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that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and
punish nonmembers of their tribe. The judgments below are
therefore reversed.
Reversed.
MR. JusTICE BRENNAN
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February 24, 1978

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
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Suquamish Indian Tribe
et al.

Dear Bill,
Please join me in your excellent opinion
an this very difficult subject.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Rehnquist
Copies to the Conference
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MEMORANDUM TO MR o JUSTICE POWELL

FROM:

Nancy
RE:

Oliphant opinion

Feb. 27, 1978

As I mentioned to you earlier, the crux of this
opinion is that upon the formation of the United States,
Indian tribes lost their inherent sovereignty insofar as
trying non-Indians was conceun~ The opinion draws a distrue
tinction between/sovereignty and the limited sovereignty
of the Indian tribes,

wh~h

allowed them to govern themselves

but did not include the power to try non-Indians o The
opinion does not state that although Indian tribes once might
criminal
have been sovereign, Congress explicitly took away/jurisdiction
over non-Indians 9 either through § 1152 (the interracial
Eimexxxx crimes statute) or otherwise o
Thete are certain problems with this approach o I
wonder, under the opinion's reasoning, whether a tribe would
have criminal jurisdiction over an Indian wax who nevertheless
is not a member of the tribe asserting jurisdictiono

1

~~ that
:

the tribe

would ~

have such jurisdiction, since i t would

~ ~ ·-'"1L~~ 4

-'•...P-

Iff..-

I assume

~~4.<-c .. ~ ~

~

~
1'\

,,J

~ ~~ &..e~~~ .. ,laric:..J~

..

not be a facet of xi self-government.
A theoretical problem is how do we know that whatever
inherent criminal jurisdiction Indian tribes possessed was
taken away when the United States became sovereign.

The first

section of the opinion is devoted to this problem, I think;
it chronicles the assumptions of people in the 19th

~

century, who were closer to this issue than we are, that
the Indians lacked criminal jurisdiction over non-Indianso
I find the 19th century evidence persuasive; there really
has

HB

never been much doubt in my mind that 19th century

Congresses that enacted Indian legislation and enacted
treaties assumed that the Indians could not try non-Indians.
Because of this,axKHMpXiBR I had thought before that the
Court could say that Congress implicitly took away whatever
criminal jurisdiction the Indians might have had in the
various Trade and Intercourse Acts in the 19th century.
But this approach met with the problem that there was no
explicit withdrawal of jurisdiction by Congress, and under
the presumption in favor of construing statute:S/ in

the

Indians' favor, it seemed that such an explicit withdrawal
of jurisdiction would have to be found in order to rule against
the Indians o It was for this reason that Buzz Thompson, who
drafted WHR's opinion, decided to take the approach he did.
The tack that probably will be taken by the dissent is
that sovereignty includes all power within a certain territory,

I

and cannot be dissected the way the majority doeso

Although

I would tend to agree with this as a general priniiple, the

nature of tribal jurisdiction has never been so clear.
~

Tribes obviously lack some of the basic powers of sovereignty,
such as the power to dispose of land within the sovereign's
territory.

For this reason, I do not think the majority's

position is untenable in saying that criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians is one of the things that was given up
when the tribes accepted the ultimate sovereignty of the
United States o
~

A problem that still remains is that the Ccurt has
intimated that Indian courts could assert civil jurisdiction
over non-Indians.

J

Of course in the cases involving civil

jurisdiction, this
,, Court's holdings mostly have been that
II

the state courts could not assert jurisdiction over a
dispute between an indian and a non-Indian that arose &f
on tribal land o It does not necessarily follow that the

T~

dispute must be resolved by a triaal court.
conclusion might follow.

-

But I think that
fatal
Buzz does not see aR/inconsistency

between the assertion of civil jurisdiction and the denial
of criminal jurisdiction, however, because of the significant
difference between civil and crlminal proceedings o He draws
an xi analogy (not in the opinion) between civil proceedings
and arbitration.

Although civil disputes may be submitted

to an arbitrator, we would not allow criminal disputes to be
so handledo

Similarly, it's okay for a tribal court to

adjudicate a civil dispute between Indian and

non~indian,

because the interests at stake are not comparable to those
in a £X criminal

proceeding~.

Because I think this is a difficult case, I would
recommend that you await the dissent before voting.

This is

a fairly feeble recommendation, however, because my instinctive
feeling is that the majority's result is the correct one.
And because of the problems that would attend an attempt to
say that Congress actually withdrew Indian criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, I do not think I could write a decent
concurrence along those lineso

Buzz told me that he read

every word of every 19th century treaty, in addition to
all the legislative history of the 19th century Indian
statutes, before concluding that the opinion could not be
written to say that there was such a withdrawal of jurisdictiono
If I were voting, I would want to see the dissent before
doing so, just to make sure I understood the arguments for
the other point of view; but my hunch is that I would vote
\ with the majority in the endo
Nancy
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BENCH MEMO
TO:
FROM:

Mr. Justice Powell
Nancy Bregstein
RE:

DATE:

Jan. 6, 1978

No. 76-5729, Oliphant & Belgarde v. The
Suquamish Indian Tribe
I.

Introduction

This is a very complicated case, and there is no
easy answer.

There may not even be an answer, but I will

try to point out some of the relevant considerations.

This

memo will not be able to go into all the intricacies of the
relevant {and tangential) treaties and statutes discussed
in the briefs of the parties and amici; and my conclusions
will be tentative and subject to further illumination at
oral argument.

I will discuss the issues in the order they

are presented in most of the briefs:

inherent tribal

sovereignty; assuming such sovereignty, whether it has been
relinquished voluntarily by the tribe or taken away by
federal statute or treaty; whether exclusive jurisdiction
has been vested in the tribe by virtue of the Treaty of
Point Elliott; effect of Pub. L. 280 and the various
actions taken pursuant to that statute by the State of
Washington.

First, though, I'll attempt to summarize

significant developments in Indian law as they relate to
criminal jurisdiction, as background.

This summary is

taken largely from Clinton, Development of Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands:

The Historical

Perspective, 17 Ariz. L. Rev. 951 (1975).

You may be

familiar with much of this already.

II.

A Summary of Developments in Indian Law

At first, Congress dealt with Indian tribes
primarily by treaty.

This was consistent with the European

practice of treating the tribes as sovereign nations.
During the very early period (1778-1796) Congress treated
the tribes as sovereign nations; and
many of the early treaties recognized the Indians'
jurisdiction to deal with non-Indians who settled
on Indian lands and committed crimes thereon.
Such jurisdictional grants apparently assumed that
the Indian tribes were sovereign and possessed
complete governmental powers over their own lands,
including the powers to try non-Indians."
Clinton, at 954.

Clinton notes, however, that even during

this early period many treaties provided for federal
prosecution of Indians who commited crimes against
non-Indians on the Indians' land.

This observation seems

to indicate that at first Congress was more concerned about
asserting federal jurisdiction when the victim was a
non-Indian than when the alleged perpetrator was a
non-Indian.

By 1789, however, a treaty with several Indian

tribes provided for the trial in territorial or state court
of non-Indians who committed crimes in Indian territory.
This treaty also provided that the tribe could try
non-Indians who settled in Indian territory illegally, but
this really is a distinct situation and not dispositive of
jurisdiction to try non-Indians who commit crimes in Indian
territory when they were there legally.
After 1796, Clinton says, treaty provisions
allowing Indians to try non-Indians virtually disappeared.
"The trend was away from a land sovereignty notion of
jurisdiction and toward a concept based primarily on the
citizenship of the parties."

Id. 955.

"Federal

jurisdiction, which had previously been limited to
situations in which the victim was a citizen of the United
States, was now extended to cases in which either the
perpetrator or the victim was a citizen or resident of the
United States."

Id.

It could be argued from this pattern that the
absence of such a provision, providing for federal
prosecution of non-Indians, in the treaty entered into with
the Suquamish in 1855 (the Treaty of Point Elliott)
indicated that the tribe retained jurisdiction.

This

point, and the relevance of the Treaty in general, will be
discussed in Part Iy.A., infra.

For now it is sufficient

to note that Clinton is talking about the period around
1796; it may be that by the time the treaty was signed with
~

the Suquamish, it was taken for granted that Indians would
not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.

This

hypothesis is confirmed by the fact that the Cherokees
insisted on including a provision in their treaty of 1866
that would give them jurisdiction over intra-tribal
matters.

If Indian tribes have any inherent sovereignty,

surely it would be over such matters; yet a provision to
that effect was included.

It appears that it is not

terribly safe to assume that the reason for the inclusion
of a certain provision was that in its absence, the
contrary state of affairs would have obtained.

It is hard

to tell whether provisions were included to confirm the
status quo or to change it.
What I find most notable about Clinton's
description of this early period is the trend to include
treaty provisions for federal prosecution of Indians who
committed interracial crimes.

Clinton notes that this

development constituted a gradual infringement on tribal
sovereignty.

On the other hand, federal responsibility for

prosecuting non-Indians for interracial crimes seems to
have been assumed almost from the outset and was not
considered as significant an intrusion as the later
assertion of jurisdiction over Indians.
The use of treaties ended in 1871, when the House
(which had not say in treaty-making) succeeded in enacting
a measure that provided that no Indian tribe would

thereafter be recognized as an independent nation with whom
the United States could contract by treaty.
,

Certain federal statutes were enacted even during
the treaty-making period.

The most important one for our

purposes is now codified at 18

u.s.c.

"interracial crimes" section).

§

1152 (the

This provision originally

was enacted as part of the Trade and Intercourse Act of
1790.

It originally provided for federal prosecution of

United States citizens or residents who committed any crime
or trespassed on Indian land.

Clinton, at 958.

The Act

was expanded significantly in 1817 to provide for federal
prosecution of Indians who committed crimes in Indian
territory.

"In expressly providing a federal forum for

crimes committed by an Indian, Congress expanded federal
jurisdiction for the first time to cases in which the
defendant was an Indian . . . . "

Id. 959.

(Note again

that Clinton regards the coverage of Indians--not nonIndians--as the significant expansion of federal
jurisdiction.)
excepted.

Intra-Indian crimes were specifically

This statute later became part of

§

25 of the

first permanent Trade and Intercourse Act in 1834, was
amended the last time in 1854, and eventually was codified
at 18

u.s.c

§

1152.

(During this early period the states were not
involved in this jurisdiction maze, because Indians had
been moving west faster than states.

It was not until 1861

that Congress confronted the problem of allocating
jurisdiction when an Indian reservation was located in a
state and otherwise would be subject to the jurisdiction of

6.

the state; then Congress required states to disclaim
jurisdiction over Indian lands as a condition to admission
to the Union.)
Clinton's conclusion about the period up to 1871
is:
"[D]uring this period Congress slowly encroached
on the tribal jurisdiction over Indian territory
by providing a federal forum for the trial of
crimes committed on Indian lands in which either
the victim or perpetrator of the crime was a
non-Indian. While such enactments began, as did
the treaties, P.Y_granting federal jurisdiction
only where the alleged perpetrator of the crime
was non-Indian, by the end of the treaty period
both the treaties and the statutes also granted
the federal courts criminal jurisdiction if a
serious crime were committed by an Indian against
the person or property of a non-Indian."

~

J lf1/

~
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Id. 961 (emphasis supplied).
~~

The other major statute relevant to this case is
the

M~t,

now 18

u.s.c.

§

passed the Major Crimes Act in 1885.

1153.

Congress

tt::Zc_/-

It was the greatest

~

..

~

thus far because it provided for federal jurisdiction even

V"C<-~
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fe.J.·~

intrusion into tribal jurisdiction over criminal offenses

when both

1V

~

.,._A
A .... _____,

the alleged perpetrator were

~~

Indians and the crime took place on Indian land.

(Even

today, however, it is not clear whether the Major Crimes

~ ,u,lD.. • ...(

Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction.

k.. ~~~ ...~

Several

lower courts have so held, but this Court has not addressed
the question.

In Talton v.

Ma~,

163

u.s. 376, however,

the Court ruled on a question involving a criminal trial in
a tribal court where the offense was murder, and therefore
should have been held in federal court if the Major Crimes
Act were exclusive, without mentioning why the Major Crimes

~~~

~·

-
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Act had not ousted tribal jurisdiction over the offense.
The Court probably did not consider the question.
Alternatively, it has been suggested that a treaty
provision with the Cherokees required that they be allowed
to try their own members for major crimes.
964 n. 75.

See Clinton, at

It is not clear that this should make a

difference, however, because unlike

§

1152,

§

1153 does not

carve out an exception to federal jurisdiction for
situations where a treaty provision gives exclusive
jurisdiction to the tribe.

Today the question is not of

great practical significance, except for double jeopardy

~·A·~

purposes, because the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968

~

limited the sentencing power of tribal courts to 6 months
in jail or a $500 fine.

,eJ..;

~t-~ I~C.&'

Thus an Indian could be tried for

£,.;.~~

~./-4.

murder by a tribal court, but he could receive only a

... , ... ~

~r'V

minimal sentence.)

~~
II.

Inherent Tribal Sovereignty

The parties and amici address the question whether
tribes possess inherent sovereignty because they believe it
will start the Court off with the correct presumption.
Supposedly, if the Court is convinced that Indian tribes
possess inherent sovereignty--i.e., independent of and not
derived from congressional grant--then it would take
explicit congressional action to take away such
sovereignty.

The parties seem to agree about this.

On the

other hand, if the Court can be convinced that tribes do
not possess inherent sovereignty, and that the focus of

-

8.

recent cases is simply to evaluate the relevant treaties
and statutes, then petrs have a much better chance of
winning, because the relevant statutes are not very clear.
The Court might then construe the statutes as not granting
tribal jurisdiction over alleged crimes by non-Indians.
I am not sure that the respective views of tribal
sovereignty are that helpful. Or, perhaps, the concept of
------------------~---------,
tribal
sovereignty is such an amorphous and, at least in
modern times, weak ..........
concept,
.., that it does not take us very
far in reaching the correct result in this case.

It is

acknowledged that the federal government has the power to

-----~
define
and restrict ~~-----------~'----------------------tribal sovereignty, which makes that

sovereignty look very much like a grant of authority from
Congress, as a practical matter, regardless of the original
and theoretical explanation for the tribes' powers.

Thus

in the end it is most useful simply to attempt to glean
Congress' understanding in enacting its various treaties
and Indian statutes, without much of a presumption in
either direction.

The only presumption that should apply

is the canon of construction with respect to Indians that
statutes should be construed, as much as possible, in the
Indians' favor.
The early view of tribal sovereigny was fairly
clear and "platonic", McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax
Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164.

In his two opinions in Cherokee

Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, and Worcester v. Georgia, 6
Pet. 515, Chief Justice Marshall described the Indian
tribes as quasi-sovereign entities.

This description was

9•

used, at least in Worcester, to stave off an assertion of
state jurisdiction.

In subsequent cases, including fairly

recent ones, the Court has adhered to the notion that the
Indian tribes are sovereign, when the challenge comes from
the state in which the tribe is located.

A concept of

federal preemption (as described in McClanahan) probably
would lead to the same result in almost all cases involving
attempted assertions of state jurisdiction.

See

McClanahan, supra, at 172 n. 8:
"The extent of federal pre-emption and residual
Indian sovereignty in the total absence of federal
treaty obligations or legislation is therefore now
something of a moot question. [Citations
omitted.] The question is generally of little
more than theoretical importance, however, since
in almost all cases federal treaties and statutes
define the boundaries of federal and state
jurisdiction."
In McClanahan the Court described the notion of tribal
sovereignty as a "backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read."

411 U.S. at

172.
Since it is well-settled that the Indian tribes
are not subject to the jurisdiction of the states unless
Congress specifically so directs, the cases discussing

------------~~-----------------tribal
sovereignty in the context of assertions of state
jurisdiction are not very helpful in the present context.
~'

Fisher v. District Court, 424

McClanahan,

~upra;

u.s. 382 (1976);

Warren Trading_Post v. Tax Comm'n, 380

U.S. 685 (1965); Williams v. Lee, 358

u.s. 217 (1958).

Washington Attorney General suggests that the concept of
tribal sovereignty in all these cases was used simply

·'

The

I

10.

as a "shield to ward off assertions by the states of
jurisdiction over Indians."

Brief at 9.

Recognizing that not all cases discussing tribal
sovereignty have involved assertions of state jurisdiction,
he suggests that the concept has been useful in one other
area, also not relevant to this case:

"It forms the basis

for fending off attacks

against federal legislation

granting special treatment to

Indians",~.,

Mancari, 417

u.s.

535 (1974)

Morton v.

(preference for Indians in the

Bureau of Indian Affairs), or in validating the exercise of
some congressional power with respect to Indians that might
not have been valid with respect to purely voluntary
groups,~.,

United States v. Mazurie, 419

u.s.

544 (1975)

(delegation of power to the tribe to regulate liquor);
United States v. Antelope,

u.s.

(1977)

(validity of

Major Crimes Act).

~~ ~

Thus the Washington AG suggests that tribal
It

~T~

"

jurisdiction is merely personal (over members of the

----

tribe), and not_ ;:..::.ritorial.

?"-"' .,.c

But this theory breaks down

in light of several decisions of this Court.

conduct on the reservation, and to enforce their law

Williams v. Lee.

----

This was true in Mazurie and in
In both cases, non-Indians on the

reservation were required to submit their disputes with
Indians to the tribal court, rather than the state courts.
The AG is right, of course, that these decisions are
distingu ~ h~b ~

I rom the instant case both because this

~..w-...w-

C. C-)

~

•• •

.
~

L'f

The Court has J:z~ ~ :::f~""'-<#

allowed the tribes to regulate various aspects of civil

against outsiders.

.

11.
case involves criminal jurisdiction and because this case
involves a conflict between federal and tribal authority,
not state and tribal authority.

But the fact remains that

in certain cases, the Court has recognized tribal authority
even without a congressional grant.

Furthermore, it has

been suggested (by yicki Jackson) that there was not a
clear distinction between civil and criminal jurisdiction
in 19th century Indian affairs, so that sovereignty would
be equally broad with respect to both spheres.
Apart from the language in the cases involving
attempted assertions of state sovereignty, the Court held
in Talton v. Mayes, 163

u.s.

376 (1896), that the Fifth

Amendment did not apply to the proceedings of a tribal
court, because the court derived its power from tribal
sovereignty, not from the federal government; and it held
in the

Puyull~

case that an Indian tribe possesses

sovereign immunity, which, though waivable by Congress,
exists in the first place independent of congressional
grant.
Furthermore, the right of tribes to punish
criminal conduct between Indians on the reservation is not
challenged.

Of course it has been held that jurisdiction

over offenses between non-Indians, even if committed on a
reservation, is in the states; but this result seems to
derive from an interpretation of the congressional enabling
legislation admitting states into the Union, and therefore
can be interpreted as an explicit congressional withdrawal
of jurisdiction from the tribes.

See United States v.

McBratney, 104

u.s.

-

12.

621: Draper v. United States, 164 U.S.

240: New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496.

Although there is no simple answer to the question

-

whether tribes possess inherent sovereignty or not, I think
the answer is that they do.

Because it is recognized that

Congress has plenary power to shape and limit the tribes'
sovereignty, however, the relevant inquiry is into the
statutes and treaties relating to Indian criminal
jurisdiction.

The approach is not as clear-cut as

respondents would suggest, however.

They combine the

inherent sovereignty of the tribe with the canon of
construction applicable to Indians and conclude that there
must be very clear and explicit congressional action to
withdraw the tribe's jurisdiction.

But even in the context

of state sovereignty, which is more concrete than tribal
sovereignty and is explicitly protected by the Tenth
Amendment, it is accepted that Congress may preempt state
power by action Congress is constitutionally entitled to
take.

Since Congress' power to regulate Indian affairs is

greater than its power to regulate the states, it would
seem that less evidence of congressional preemption would
be required in the Indian context than in the context of
states.
III.
A.

Relevant Statutes

18 U.S.C. § 1152

Section 1152 provides:
"
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the general laws of the United States as to the
punishment of offenses committed in any place
within the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States, except the District of Columbia,
shall extend to the Indian country.

'h.t!4 ~c ~r
~
T~

d..c
~

13.

This section shall not extend to offenses
committed by an Indian against the person or
property of another Indian, nor to any Indians
committing any offense in the Indian country who
has been punished by the local laws of the tribe,
or to any case where, by treaty stipulations, the
exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or
may be secured to the Indian tribes respectively."
This was the provision in effect at the time the Treaty of
Point Elliott was signed, because the statute was last
revised in 1854 {a year before the Treaty) .

The 1854

amendment inserted the second exception, for Indians who
already had been punished by the tribe.
First I will consider the SG's argument that the
Suquamish fall within the third explicit exception to

§

1152, and therefore have exclusive jurisdiction over
offenses committed on the
the effect of
A.

§

reservation~

then I will consider

1152 generally.

The treaty exception

The SG argues that the Treaty of Point Elliott
gave the Suquamish exclusive jurisdiction and therefore
§

1152 does not apply by its own terms.

I think there is

little merit to this argument {so little, in fact, that
respondents themselves did not even attempt to make it) .
The SG's argument seems to be that since the Suquamish
possessed full territorial sovereignty up to the time of
the Treaty, we have to look to see whether that sovereignty
{at least over criminal offenses of non-Indians) was
voluntarily surrendered by the tribe or taken away.
Because the treaty is silent as to criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, the SG concludes that there was no
voluntary surrender; and the SG sees no action to take away

14.
the sovereignty in the successive forms of the Trade and
Intercourse Act that ultimately became

§

1152 or in the

(Since this latter argument is also

Treaty itself.

relevant to the statutory analysis simpliciter, I will
discuss it in the next section.)
The objection to the SG's view is that silence in

----------------------

--- - -

the Treaty does not indicate that Congress was leaving

--

criminal jurisdiction in the tribe, but rather that it was

----

- -

assumed that Indians did not have criminal jurisdiction

----....
over non-Indians.

The SG counters by saying that many

~

treaties were not silent.
suggested in Part II,

~upra

He also counters the argument
(that by 1855 it was assumed

that Indians did not possess criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians) by stating that Indian policy fluctuated and
was not always consistent.

But it seems to me that the

SG's argument, if it proves anything, is that the federal
government in general had not taken away criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians, not that the Treaty of Point
Elliott specifically provided for exclusive Indian
jurisdiction.

There is nothing in the Treaty to suggest an

explicit reservation of such power to the tribe.
(Furthermore, the SG recognizes that this notion
of exclusive jurisdiction in the Tribe would have been very
hard to honor before enactment of the Indian Civil Rights
Act in 1968.

The SG's argument--that the subsequent

passage of legislation guaranteeing certain procedural
safeguards in Indian trials makes acceptance of exclusive
jurisdiction in the Tribe more palatable--makes the
interpretation of an 1855 treaty turn on legislation passed

~

A.~~~~-~
~~~.~

~J,J-t.~'.

~~

~- 9.,.~ ...

,

15.
more than a century later.

This is hard to accept; and it

is doubtful that 19th century Americans were more willing
to give this kind of jurisdiction to an Indian tribe than
20th century Americans would be.

Thus the SG's

characterization of the situation as an agreement between
Indians and non-Indians that now can be fulfilled because
of a fortuitous development sounds somewhat unrealistic.)
B.

Section 1152 in general

The SG's alternative contention (along with
•

respondents') is that
f~deral

governm~ t

§

1152 vests jurisdiction in the

over crimes taking place on Indian

-

-

territory, but that this jurisdiction is simplY concurrent

____......,

with tribal jurisdiction.
jurisdiction under

§

Petrs insist that federal

1152 is exclusive.

Either conception

may be right; all the evidence in either direction is quite
equivocal.

In following the canon of construction that

statutes are to be construed in the Indians' favor, it
probably would be advisable to rule that the jurisdiction
is concurrent.

But there are two objections to this tack,

aside from the specific evidence, discussed infra, that
congressional intent was to make

§

1152 exclusive.

First, the Court has recognized that this canon of
construction is no more than an aid to construction; it
does not license the Court to rule in favor of the Indians
when such an interpretation cannot logically be gleaned
from the statutory framework.

In DeCoteau v. District

County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 447, the Court said (emphasis
in original):

16.

"But we cannot rewrite the 1889 Agreement and the
1891 statute. For the courts to reinstate the
entire reservation, on the theory that retention
of mere allotments was ill-advised, would carry us
well beyond the rule by which legal ambiguities
are resolved to the benefits of the Indians. We
give this rule the broadest possible scope, but it
remains at base a canon for construing the complex
treaties, statutes, and contracts which define the
status of Indian tribes. A canon of construction
is not a license to disregard clear expressions of
tribal and congressional intent."
The complex pattern of statutes and treaties in the instant
case does not contain "clear expressions of tribal and
congressional intent", however, so the above quotation is
not completely applicable.

But this case tests the limits

of the canon of construction, because here Congress'
underlying understanding seems clear, while its
pronouncements were not.

-

Second, there is difficulty here even in applying
the canon of construction.

When

§

-

-

1152 was enacted (in its

--------~,--------~
earlier
forms), Congress thought it was dojng something

good for the Indians.

It was recognized that tribal law

and courts were not adequate to punish non-Indians who
committed crimes in Indian territory; the provision of
federal prosecution was viewed as a benefit to the
Indians.

On the other hand, it would have been hard to

argue in the 19th century, and even harder today, that the
Indians would not have been more benefitted by the
provision of federal prosecution concurrent with tribal
authority, than that the federal jurisdiction was meant to
oust tribal jurisdiction.
With these caveats in mind, I will examine the
arguments for and against exclusive federal jurisdiction.

-

First, there is the language of

§

1152 itself.

The section provides that the law governing offenses
committed "in any place within the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, except the District of
Columbia, shall extend to Indian country."
can be interpreted in one of two ways.

This language

Petrs argue that

the language means that conduct in Indian country is viewed
as if it occurred in any place under the sole and exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States, i.e., Indian country is
subjected to the sole and exclusive jurisdiction of the
United States.

At first blush this reading seemed

implausible to me, because the interpretation offered by
respondents seemed more logical.

Respondents'

interpretation is that the quoted language simply
identifies the body of law to be applied in Indian country,
i.e., the body of law applicable in federal enclaves.

The

statute does not convert Indian country into a federal
enclave, however, and has nothing to do with whether
federal law in Indian country is to be exclusive or
concurrent with the resdiuum of sovereignty possessed by
tribes.

Either interpretation seems plausible; and I would

not draw any hard and fast conclusions from the statutory
language itself.

If the canon of construction in favor of

Indians is applied, the ambiguous language probably should
be taken to identify the body of law applicable under
§

1152, and not to proclaim Indian country to be within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

'

t • .,

18.
'-""

Second, petrs argue:

"To hold that federal

jurisdiction over Indian land is exclusive as to the state,
but concurrent with tribal jurisdiction discriminates
against the natural sovereign rights of state citizens."
Petrs' brief at 109.

I am not sure I understand this

point, but as I understand it, it is wrong.

The premise of

the argument is that without federal intercession, the
state would be sovereign over Indian reservations within
the state's borders.

This harks back to petr's argument

that tribal power comes from the federal government and not
from the inherent sovereignty the tribe possessed before
conquest.

Such an argument, as explained in Part II,

supra, seems to be wrong under this Court's decisions.
An argument could be made, however, that since
federal legislation preempts state legislation on the same
subject, despite the fact that states are at least as
sovereign as Indian tribes, why should the result be any
different when the federal government legislates with
respect to a subject as to which the tribe otherwise would
have been sovereign?

I suppose the answer to this would be

that federal legislation is not preemptive when Congress
does not intend it to be; and here it could be argued that
Congress intended federal criminal jurisdiction to be
concurrent with tribal jurisdiction.
Third,

§

1152 is comprehensive except for three

specified exceptions.

Federal jurisdiction does not exist

when the crime takes place between Indians, when the Indian

19.

already has been punished by the tribe, or when treaty
provisions provide for exclusive tribal jurisdiction.

The

parties have described the second exception as a "double
jeopardy" exception.

The exception refers only to the

previous trial of an Indian by the tribe, not to the
previous trial of a non-Indian.

Petrs argue, therefore,

that since it is inconceivable that Congress wanted to
protect Indians from double jeopardy while ignoring the
possible double jeopardy plight of a non-Indian, the only
rational explanation is that Congress assumed tribes could
not try non-Indians.
Respondents have several answers to this.

(a) The

"double jeopardy" exception was enacted in response to the
trial of an Indian who already had been punished by the
tribe; Congress' concern was limited by that factual
context.

(b) Even if the omission of reference to

non-Indians was advertant, the explanation might be that
Congress was willing to leave punishment of Indians to the
tribes, but was not willing to forego punishment of
non-Indians, even if they already had been punished by a
tribe.

(This is a direct rebuttal of petr's view that

Congress would have been as concerned, if not more, with
the double jeopardy problem of trying non-Indians twice.)
(c) It is not apparent that Congress assumed that Indians
could not try non-Indians; Congress may well have assumed
that Indians would not do so, but this would have been
because of lack of inclination rather than lack of power.
(Indeed, yicki Jackson's theory of this case is that
~

Congress did not distinguish between Indian civil and

criminal jurisdiction in the 19th century, because the
Indians did not draw that distinction.

Rather, they

punished their own members by requiring restitution to the
injured person and rituals of shaming, etc.--without true
criminal trials--and the Indians would not have been
motivated to "try" non-Indians in this way.)
I tend to think that conceiving of the second
exception as a double jeopardy provision is erroneous.

It

is more likely that respondents' second point is correct:
Congress was not concerned with punishing an Indian who
already had been punished by his tribe.

On the other hand,

the fact that no reference is made to non-Indians is
evidence that Congress did not think Indians either could
or would try non-Indians.
Fourth, petrs argue that the jurisdiction
conferred by

§

1152 must have been exclusive because

concern was expressed in Congress that the provision might
infringe Indian sovereignty, and if there was to be any
infringement, it would have to be because no Indian
jurisdiction would be left.

Simple concurrent jurisdiction

would not amount to an infringement.
answer to this contention.
to

§

There is no easy

If not for the third exception

1152 (for situations where treaties guarantee the

tribe exclusive jurisdicton) it might have been argued that
even concurrent jurisdiction would infringe the rights of
tribe's whose treaties provided for exclusive tribal
jurisdiction.
has some force.

But given this exception, petrs' argument
On the other hand, the exception might

have been enacted to assuage the worries of those
legislators who were concerned about infringing tribal
sovereignty.

-

Fifth, all the precedents hold that Indians could

...

not try non-Indians. This includes one circuit court
...
decision, Ex Parte Kenyon, 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark.

-

1878), dictum in one Supreme Court decision, In re
Mayfield, 141 U.S. 107 (1891), two opinions of the Attorney
General, and the opinion of the Solicitor of the Interior
(1970) until it was withdrawn after the district court
decision in this case.

.

Respondents attack most of the

reasoning in these various sources, and their attack is
persuasive.

In Kenyon, for example, the conduct at issue

took place on land outside an Indian reservation, so the
decision is not relevant to the assertion of jurisdiction
on reservation.

On the other hand, the inability of tribes

to punish non-Indians has been the law for over a century;
and this is the first case challenging the status quo.
Perhaps that is evidence in itself of what the 19th century
assumptions were, on the part of Congress and the tribes.
Respondent's main arguments are that since the
Trade and Intercourse Acts were enacted for the benefit of
the Indians (to provide for punishment of offenders not
punished by the tribe), it should not be construed to oust
concurrent tribal jurisdiction; that the inclusion in many
treaties of a provision divesting the Indians of
jurisdiction over non-Indians would not make sense, and
would be surplusage, if

'•

§

1152 already accomplished that

result; and that until 1854, when the statute was amended
to include the exception an Indian who already had been
tried, the statute could not possibly have been considered
exclusive, because if it was, a tribe's sovereignty over
its own members would have been withdrawn.
I find it very difficult to evaluate the relative
merits of these competing arguments.

I do not think there

was affirmative intent on Congress' part to vest

-

jurisdiction of non-Indians in the tribes.

But in this

context--where tribes started off sovereign--such
affirmative intent is not necessary.

Congress probably

thought either that the situation would not come up (i.e.,
that tribes woul£ not assert such jurisdiction), or that
tribes could not assert such jurisdiction (i.e, that
federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes was to be
exclusive).

In other words, I would imagine that if

Congress had been confronted with the question whether
tribes should be allowed to assert criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians, it would have answered in the negative.
This would follow from the trend, noted in Part II,

~upra,

to vest more and more jurisdiction in the federal
government.

And, as noted in Part I, federal jurisdiction

was asserted over non-Indian defendants, in treaty
provisions, before it was asserted over Indian defendants.
As a matter of fact, a bill (the Western Territory bill)
was rejected, at the same time the 1934 Trade and
Intercourse Act was passed, that would have provided for
concurrent jurisdiction between the tribes and the federal

government.

Petrs say that the bill was rejected partly

because of this provision, but we do not really know why
the bill was not passed.)
Since Congress did not speak explicitly to this
point, the question is whether its tacit assumption that
such jurisdiction would or could not be asserted by the
tribes is sufficient to oust tribal jurisdiction.
an impasse on this point.

I am at

In a normal case, I think I

would conclude that this was sufficient; the question in
this case is whether the presumption in favor of a
construction favorable to the Indians tips the scale enough
to come out the other way.
C.

Relevance of

§

1153 (the MaiQ!_Crimes Act)

The SG asserts, brief at 26 n. 19, that the Major
Crimes Act is irrelevant to this case because none of the
crimes specified in it are involved here.

But the SG

concedes that the enactment of this statute "shows that the
Congress then [in 1885] apparently thought Secion 1152
covered offenses by non-Indians on reservations but not, or
not always, offenses by Indians against non-Indians."
(Emphasis in original.)

This is because the Major Crimes

.

Act applies only to crimes between
Indians; the natural
,._,
assumption therefore is that Congress thought, at the time
it passed the Major Crimes Act, that offenses by
non-Indians already were covered by

§

1152.

Petrs draw

this very inference.
Petrs also argue that the Major Crimes Act
provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction, and therefore

§

1152 must do the same.

Otherwise, only the federal

government could try and punish Indians for major crimes,
while tribes could punish non-Indians for such major
crimes.

This makes no sense.

The possible flaw in this

argument, however, is that this Court has not held that the
Major Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal
jurisdiction, although the Eighth and Tenth Circuits have
so held.

Under the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, tribal

courts may not impose sentences of more than 90 days or
$500, or both.

This suggests that tribes may not try

anyone for major crimes, because otherwise the potential
punishment would not fit the crime.

It is unlikely that

Congress would have considered this a desirable situation.
Furthermore, the Major Crimes Act does not contain an
exclusion for an Indian who already has been tried.

Amicus

Kitsap County notes that a logical explanation for this is
that Congress thought it was precluding any exercise of
tribal jurisdiction over major crimes when it enacted
§

1153.
As for legislative history, Kitsap points out that

a predecessor of the Major Crimes Act that would have
provided for concurrent jurisdiction was rejected.

On the

other hand, respondents point to legislative history to
show that Congress explicitly rejected the idea of making
federal jurisdiction over major crimes exclusive.

At first

a provision in the Act provided that Indians accused of
violating laws of the Territory would be tried in the

Territorial courts "and not otherwise".

A Congressman

objected to this provision, and it was deleted.

No

explanation is given for the deletion, however.
D.

Summary

As indicated in all of the above, I think there is
no clear answer to the question whether

§

1152 jurisdiction

is exclusive or concurrent with tribal jurisdiction.

-

The

whole statutory framework makes more sense, I think, if
federal jurisdiction over interracial crimes is regarded as
exclusive.

This follows primarily from the absence of any

reference to non-Indians in the exceptions to

§

1152 and

the anomaly that would result if tribes could try
non-Indians for major crimes (because they would have
concurrent jurisdiction of crimes committed by non-Indians,
which are not covered by

§

1153) while they could not try

their own members for major crimes.
depends on the question whether

§

The latter proposition

1153 is exclusive,

however, and the answer to that question is far from clear.

IV.

Constitutional Considerations

A possible way to approach this dilemma is to see
which result would cause greater constitutional problems.
Although not directly relevant to the threshold
jurisdictional question, an answer to the question whether
a trial by the tribe would violate petrs' constitutional
rights might point the Court in the right direction.
Unfortunately, either result seems to portend
constitutional problems.

/""'

If, the

Cour~~ there

constitutional problems.

~)
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J

will be serious

Aside from all the constitutional

challenges that inevitably will be made to the procedures
at trial, there are two more basic problems.

Non-Indians

-

cannot participate in tribal government and they cannot be
on the jury.

Neither of these problems could be solved by

7A+t ,..,._
~

requiring the participation of non-Indians in tribal

(',z...~

governments or on their juries without interfereing with

)4~c~~~•-t....)

~

the present federal policy in favor of tribal integrity.
If non-Indians had to participate in affairs of tribal
government, the tribe would become no more than a unit of
local government or a voluntary association.

As for the

procedures at trial, it as as yet unclear whether the
Indian Civil Rights Act will provide safeguards as broad as
the constitutional guarantees themselves.

This is fine for

Indians, who did not have the benefit of constitutional
rights at all before the Act, but it amounts to a
deprivation of rights for non-Indians.
On the other hand, a ruling in favor of petrs

(!us.

would not be wholly without potential constitutional
,...,__

---

problems.

~._...~~

........_....

~··...t·•-)

~

If Congress decides to grant criminal

jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribes, it would seem that
all constitutional guarantees would have to be provided at
such trials.

This is because the grant of jurisdiction

would be construed as a delegation of part of the criminal
jurisdiction of the federal government.

But if Congress

should decide to confer such jurisdiction on Indian tribes,
the problem of the constitutional rights of non-Indians is
no greater than if the Court were to affirm.

7

27.
V.

State Jurisdiction

A final factor that must be mentioned is the claim
that the State of Washington has assumed jurisdiction over
the Suquamish tribe and reservation pursuant to Pub. L.
280, enacted in 1953.

Through this act, Congress mandated

certain states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country,
and permitted other states (including Washington) to assume
such jurisdiction.

At first, all that was required to

effect an assumption of jurisdiction by the state was state
legislation and an amendment of the constitution of those
states whose constitutions disclaimed any jurisdiction over
Indian lands.

The Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 changed

this procedure, to require the consent of tribes for the
assumption of jurisdiction; but that requirement is not
relevant in this case, where Washington purported to assume
jurisdiction over Indian lands before the 1968 Act.
Petrs and the state argue that the state validly
effected this assumption of jurisdiction.

In 1957 the

state enacted legislation to assert full civil and criminal
jurisdictions over reservations that consented to such an
assumption of jurisdiction.

(This requirement of consent

was a matter of state law, unrelated to the ultimate
requirement enacted as part of the Indian Civil Rights
Act.)

The Suquamish tribe consented, but the state never

amended its constitution.

In 1963 the state enacted

another statute providing for assumption of jurisdiction,
regardless of tribal consent; but this statute included an

---- of which
exemption, except as to eight listed matters (none
are present here), for "Indians when on their tribal or
allotted lands" when those lands are held in trust.

The

state's jurisdiction thus would extend to Belgarde's case
because it took place off tribal or allotted land; it might
apply to Oliphant's case, depending on whether the
exemption of Indians on tribal land applies only to conduct

£y Indians or also to conduct involving Indians.

The SG

notes that the only question in Belgarde would be whether
state jurisdiction preempted tribal law and tribal courts
or whether the two are concurrent.

The SG suggests,

correctly I think, that "[t]hese are difficult issues which
have not been addressed by the court of appeals, and which
may not be appropriate for initial consideration here."
SG's brief at 49.
There are all sorts of other complications here,
however, involving whether the assumptions of jurisdiction
were effective (resps argue that they were not because the
Washington constitution was not amended) and whether the
state's partial retrocession of jurisdiction (giving up all
but the jurisdiction assumed under the 1963 law) was
valid.

The issue whether Washington's retrocession of

jurisdiction is valid is present in the Yakima case, which
is being held for Oliphant.

The SG urges the Court not to

decide this point (if it must be reached) before deciding
Yakima.

I will not go into all of this, because if the

Court decides to hold that the Indians do not have
jurisdiction over petrs, it will be unnecessary to decide

29.

whether the federal government (through

§§

1152 and 1153)

has jurisdiction or whether the state has jurisdiction.
On the other hand, if all the evidence thus far
convinces you that you want to affirm on the ground that
§

1152 did not preempt tribal jurisdiction over

non-Indians, then it is necessary to consider the state's
claim to jurisdiction.

The argument would be that Pub. L.

280 and Washington's assumption of jurisdiction displaced
tribal jurisdiction; the counter-argument, again, would be
that the state and tribal jurisdiction are concurrent.

In

terms of analysis, it seems to me that the result here
should not be any different than the result under

§

1152.

Pub. L. 280 was intended to give to the state's what the
federal government had under

§

1152; if

1152 is viewed as

§

exclusive, the assumption of jurisdiction by the state also
should be viewed as exclusive (although, as noted above,
this question need not be reached once it is decided that
the federal government took away tribal jurisdiction when
it enacted

§

1152).

On the other hand, if

§

1152

established concurrent jurisdiction, then the same should
be true of the state's jurisdiction assumed pursuant to
Pub. L. 280.

In short, there is no need for independent

analysis of the state's claim to jurisdiction .

....

------------------~ ----------~~----------~-- N.B.
P.S.

There is one point I neglected to mention above, with

respect to the Treaty of Point Elliott.

Respondents cite

evidence that the original proposal for the treaty included

a provision providing for federal prosecution of
interracial crimes.

This provision was the only one not

included in the final version of the treaty.

Instead, the

only provision mentioning criminal jurisdiction provided:
"Tribes may punish offenders of their own Tribe for any
offesne committed, according to their own laws, . . . "
Respondents argue that this is proof that the tribe was to
be allowed to punish non-Indians, because the provision for
federal jurisdiction was omitted from the treaty.
The counter-interpretation of this series of
events is that the omitted provision was considered
unnecessary and was omitted for that reason.
terribly

persuasive~

This is not

but, on the other hand, neither is it

reasonable to assume that an explicit treaty provision was
thought necessary to let the tribe punish its own members,
while its ability to punish non-Indians could be assumed
without an explicit treaty provision.

Again, the

contemporaneous understanding is very hard to discern.
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POST-ARGUMENT MEMO
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Nancy

RE:

Jan. 10, 1978

Oliphant

As I mentioned when we talked yesterday, I am leaning
in the directing

of saying that the tribes have concurrent

jurisdiction with the federal government, but a only by a xlg
slight margin.
(1)

Several of my reasons are as follows:

As noted in the Wheeler memo, the double jeopardy

exception for Indians really is not a double jeopardy exception,
only
because it excepts/Indians who have been punished by the tribe,
not Indians who have been vindicated.
\

Thus it seems likely

that resps' interpreaation of the provision is more accurace
than petrs:

the federal government simply was not that con-

cerned about punishing an Indian who already had been punished,
whereas it would k not want to give up its authority over
non-Indians.

This makes the failure to include non-Indians

in the exception understandable, even on the assumption that
they could be tried by a tribe "

2.
(2)

Pub. L. 280 vests the states (some mandatorily,

some voluntarily) with criminal and civil jurisdiction over
Indian tribes that the states previously lacked.

If the

theory is that this state jurisdiction is exclusive of tribal
authority (either because Congress ceded to the states its
§

1152 jurisdiction, which may be exl

e~

exclusive, or because

in passing Pub. L. 280 Congress meant the new state
jurisdiction to be exclusive}, then the Indians have lost
their civil jurisdiction as well as their criminal jurisdiction.
If xkei is means the Indians cannot even rule tribal members,
it clearly is wrong.

Even if it means Indians cannot assert

civil authority over non-Indians on the reservation, it
threatens to undermine tribal self-government, recognized
in Mazurie and Williams v. Leeo
(3)

Also with respect to Pub. L. 280:

there is

legislative history explaining that the reference to "exclusive"
state jurisdiction in Pub. L. 280 meaKxmeRax meant exclusive
of the federal government.

When this was explained, the

Interior Department said it did not have the reservations
about the bill it had had previously.

This may mean that

the Intermor Department was upset about the idea of depriving
Indians of concurrent jurisdiction.
None of this is conclusive, but it is some evidence
that can be added to the mix of evidence in the original memo.

N.B.

1/
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